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The SERSCIS approach aims to support the use of interconnected systems of services in Critical Infrastructure (CI) ap-
plications. The problem of system interconnectedness is aptly demonstrated by ‘Airport Collaborative Decision Making’
(A-CDM). Failure or underperformance of any of the interlinked ICT systems may compromise the ability of airports to
plan their use of resources to sustain high levels of air trafﬁc, or to provide accurate aircraft movement forecasts to the wider
European air trafﬁc management systems. The proposed solution is to introduce further SERSCIS ICT components to man-
age dependability and interdependency. These use semantic models of the critical infrastructure, including its ICT services,
to identify faults and potential risks and to increase human awareness of them. Semantics allows information and services
to be described in such a way that makes them understandable to computers. Thus when a failure (or a threat of failure)
is detected, SERSCIS components can take action to manage the consequences, including changing the interdependency
relationships between services. In some cases, the components will be able to take action autonomously — e.g. to manage
‘local’ issues such as the allocation of CPU time to maintain service performance, or the selection of services where there
are redundant sources available. In other cases the components will alert human operators so they can take action instead.
The goal of this paper is to describe a Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) that can be used to address the management of
ICT components and interdependencies in critical infrastructure systems.
Keywords: resilience; QoS; SOA; critical infrastructure, SLA;
1. Introduction
The SERSCIS (“Semantically Enhanced, Resilient and
Secure Critical Infrastructure Services”) approach aims
to support the use of interconnected ICT systems used
to plan and manage operations in critical infrastructure
such as airports. Failure or underperformance of any of
the interlinked ICT systems owing to faults, mismanage-
ment or (cyber-)attack compromise the ability of any or
all the interconnected businesses to plan their use of re-
sources, to maintain high levels of efﬁciency, and to con-
tinue providing information needed by others. The SER-
SCIS approach is to develop service-oriented technolo-
gies for creating, monitoring and managing ICT systems,
allowing dynamic adaptation to manage changing situa-
tions, and to counter the risk ampliﬁcation effect of in-
terconnectedness. This can be evaluated by investigating
failure scenarios caused by or impacting ICT systems, to
show how SERSCIS provides more accurate risk assess-
ments and thereby allows the impact of such failures to be
minimised.
The technical approach used by SERSCIS is to treat
each ICT component as a service, which has a speciﬁ-
cation of its dependability properties incorporated into a
Service Level Agreement (SLA) with its users (humans
or other services). This allows interconnections between2 M. Hall-May, M. Surridge and R. Nossal-T¨ uyeni
services to be managed to maintain the dependability of
the overall system in which they are used. The overall
system is then able to specify its own dependability char-
acteristics for the services it in turn provides to its users.
The key objectives of the SERSCIS approach are the
following:
 todevisewaystoencodedependabilitycommitments
in a machine readable way, so they can be included
in SLAs;
 to develop service governance mechanisms to ensure
these commitments will be met, using autonomous
monitoring and management of available resources
(which may themselves be services), and adaptive
workﬂow technology to orchestrate and utilise these
resources;
 to verify the approach and its impact on best practice
in an application scenario in air transportation.
A certain amount of ‘machine intelligence’ is needed
to understand SLA commitments and to govern and or-
chestrate services according to this approach. The ap-
proach therefore makes extensive use of semantic mod-
elling and reasoning methods to underpin machine un-
derstandable dependability speciﬁcations and decision-
making. These models are also used to analyse ICT de-
pendencies and threats and to provide decision support for
human end-users during system design, deployment and
operation.
2. Related Work
At IT Innovation, the GRIA middleware (GRIA.org, n.d.)
forms a central vehicle for our research and understanding
of service oriented infrastructure. Originally developed in
the FP5 RTD Project ‘Grid Resources For Industrial Ap-
plications’, GRIA was the ﬁrst Grid middleware designed
to support computational service provision between inde-
pendent organisations who need not be part of a Virtual
Organisation or other community. Since its ﬁrst release
in 2004, GRIA has become a vehicle for conducting fur-
ther research and disseminating (as open source software)
new results in multi-stakeholder service oriented infras-
tructure. Insights gained from GRIA provide the fun-
damental basis for the SERSCIS approach to developing
strategies and mechanisms to model and manage risk and
interdependency in increasingly autonomic services and
infrastructure. SERSCIS is also related to other previous
work by the authors, namely innovations in dynamic se-
curity, workﬂow and service management using bilateral
SLA that were developed as part of the NextGRID project
(NextGRID, n.d.).
In its aims, the SERSCIS approach also builds on
the successes of a number of other projects. Research
in project DIRC and its successor InDeED (Sommerville
et al., 2007) raised the need to tackle dependability
throughout the lifecycle of a system, including its inter-
actions with humans. CRUTIAL (Verissimo et al., 2008)
used Petri net and state modelling to understand the opera-
tion, behaviour and failure modes of CI in systems of sys-
tems arrangements. The IRRIIS project (Balducelli et al.,
2008) is also improving CI dependability through Mid-
dleware Improved Technology and simulation in synthetic
environments. There has been work on fault and sabotage
tolerance using SLA for Grids (Hovestadt, 2005; Naqvi
et al., 2008), which SERSCIS builds on to create resilient
service-oriented infrastructures.
DeDiSys (Froihofer et al., 2007) aims to manage the
trade-off between availability and meeting service con-
straintsinlooselycoupledGridorP2Psystems. SERSCIS
aims to manage a similar dependability trade-off through
a framework of automated service governance, including
SLA negotiation, dynamic resourcing and run-time Qual-
ity of Service (QoS) and Quality of Experience (QoE)
monitoring, as well as adaptive workﬂow composition,
decision support and risk-aware system modelling tech-
niques. SERSCISisrelevanttocurrentresearchonquanti-
tative risk assessment, such as (Mikulik and Zajdel, 2009),
as it provides a means to monitor service-oriented infras-
tructures for the occurrence of threats and effectiveness of
mitigation strategies identiﬁed as part of the safety assess-
ment process.
3. SERSCIS Components
We propose a service-oriented architecture with SLA-
based management that builds on semantic models. This
architecture comprises the following four main areas of
component technology:
3.1. System Modelling. System modelling covers the
development of (semantic) models of critical infrastruc-
ture requirements and behaviour, including the ICT com-
ponents. These models are used throughout the SERSCIS
framework as computer-understandable descriptions that
provide the basis for automated, dependable ICT opera-
tion and feedback. The Web Ontology Language, OWL-
DL, is used to model ontologies describing critical infras-
tructure aspects. Models contain valuable system knowl-
edge as well as performance and pricing models (Benkner
and Engelbrecht, 2006).
3.2. System Governance. System governance cov-
ers the development of monitoring mechanisms and man-
agement actions and policies to maintain the dependabil-
ity (including security and trust relationships) exhibited
by SERSCIS-enabled services. The service-oriented in-
frastructure middleware GRIA (Surridge et al., 2005) is
used as a basis for the governance technological frame-
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such that dependability requirements can be met, and
where the system provides services, describing their non-
functional characteristics in (semantically tractable) Ser-
vice Dependability Agreements (SDAs).
3.3. System Composition. System composition cov-
ers the development of automated composition and or-
chestration of services to implement workﬂows at the sys-
tem level to meet dependability requirements, using Ser-
vice Dependability Agreement terms to control the selec-
tion of services from those made available by the sys-
tem governance mechanisms. The emphasis is on devel-
opment of dynamically adaptive workﬂow orchestration
mechanismsbasedonsemanticdescriptionsofworkﬂows,
dependability requirements, and (via SDA) available re-
sources.
3.4. Decision Support. Decision support covers the
provision of tools to present information to human op-
erators of critical infrastructure and its associated ICT.
SERSCIS will make use of autonomic service manage-
ment models driven by high-level policies supplied by
the operators, who may also be involved in initiating or
carrying out management actions. It is therefore nec-
essary to provide tools to help ICT implementers un-
derstand how a SERSCIS-enabled network will behave.
Decision support tools aid operators that decide how to
deploy applications in deﬁning high-level policies in a
SERSCIS-enabled framework, and in understanding the
resulting (dynamically adaptive) behaviour that changing
these policies has in an operating critical infrastructure.
4. Critical Infrastructure Management
The key to SERSCIS is that it helps to manage risks and
interdependency in the use of ICT systems within criti-
cal infrastructure, by adapting the ICT composition in re-
sponsetoevents. Managementinthiscontextisconcerned
with sending controlling signals to the critical infrastruc-
ture ICT components when monitoring data indicates a
need to do so.
Without SERSCIS, the ICT operators can of course
monitor information supplied by ICT components used
within the critical infrastructure, and take action when
they consider this information indicates a need to do so.
This provides a ‘humanised’ or ‘slow’ management loop
between the operators and the infrastructure, indicated in
the upper half of Figure 1. However, without SERSCIS,
the interconnectedness of ICT systems used makes hu-
man decision-making very difﬁcult, as problems (or ac-
tions taken) elsewhere may affect the quality of informa-
tion available with which to make decisions. Moreover,
any action a human operator takes may have an adverse
impact elsewhere. Thus the risk of incorrect responses
and the damage this might do are both increased. One of
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Fig. 1. SERSCIS Interactions with Critical Infrastructure and
Operators
the key goals of SERSCIS is to address this ‘risk ampliﬁ-
cation’ effect from ICT interconnectedness.
The SERSCIS framework monitors the critical in-
frastructure and uses a common Web service management
interface to manage the dynamic composition of services
and underlying resources. This process represents an au-
tomated management loop (marked as ‘automated man-
agement’ in Figure 1), in which the SERSCIS framework
takes action as and when required by management policy.
The management policy is deﬁned by a SERSCIS-assisted
operator and may be dynamically updated.
In addition to the above, SERSCIS governance com-
ponents may conclude that some action is required that
cannot be implemented autonomously. In such cases a
signal is sent to the human operators. These signals may
simply advise the operator that management action may
be needed, leaving the human to decide what action to
take (if any). In some cases, the signal may also propose
the action, but leave the human to decide whether or how
to carry out this action. This provides an ‘assisted’ man-
agement loop, which is also shown in Figure 1.
The operators can also provide control inputs to the
SERSCIS framework, e.g. to change the models it uses to
analyse the critical infrastructure, or to change the range
of monitoring inputs or automatic actions available to
it. These control inputs do not directly affect the criti-
cal infrastructure itself, but do change the way SERSCIS
uses agile service composition models to support its fu-
ture management. It is important to recognise that this
facility to deﬁne SERSCIS models and policies is relevant
even before the critical infrastructure and associated ICT
is deployed, as well as during its operation. In the pre-
deployment phase, this interaction can be used to support4 M. Hall-May, M. Surridge and R. Nossal-T¨ uyeni
the ICT implementers, helping them to design and conﬁg-
ure interconnected ICT systems in a way that allows risks
to be managed by design as well as through subsequent
adaptation.
5. High-level Service Architecture
The management of critical infrastructure ICT compo-
nents and interconnections is considered an integral part
of the overall SERSCIS approach. This is addressed
by treating all ICT components as services, whose de-
pendability can be speciﬁed via machine-understandable
SDAs, allowing automatic and semi-automatic manage-
ment of ICT dependability and interdependence, along
with the rest of the critical infrastructure. Thus the SER-
SCIS Framework from Figure 1 contains the following:
 services whose purpose is to establish and keep track
of the SLA that specify how critical infrastructure
ICT services should interact;
 services to monitor each critical infrastructure ICT
component and to ensure (through automated or as-
sisted control actions) that it behaves in accordance
with its SLA;
 services or other components to support dynamic
adaptation of critical infrastructure ICT, especially
itsaccesscontrolpolicies, interconnectednessandre-
sourcing levels.
The high-level architecture provides a preliminary
decomposition of these SERSCIS Framework facilities
into software components, and explains how they interact
with the critical infrastructure services they monitor and
manage. To derive this architecture, we ﬁrst consider how
the lifecycle of SLA (which are new entities introduced by
SERSCIS) should relate to the critical infrastructure ICT
services (the application to which SERSCIS is being ap-
plied).
This will lead to a decomposition of the SERSCIS
Framework needed by each service provider into compo-
nents for managing the SLA, the critical infrastructure ser-
vices, the resources available to those services, and the
way services are composed and interact with each other.
6. SLA Lifecycle
The most important architectural issue in developing for
resilience is to have a common understanding regarding
the lifecycle of SLAs, services and resources, a lesson
learned previously in the GRIA project (Surridge et al.,
2005). Unfortunately, these lifecycles are only loosely
coupled, which leads to a large variety of possible sce-
narios as shown in Figure 2. SERSCIS builds on the SLA
deﬁnition and lifecycle developed under the NextGRID
project (Hasselmeyer et al., 2007) as implemented in
the GRIA middleware (Boniface et al., 2009; Boniface
et al., 2006).
In Figure 2, the following four main state models are
illustrated:
 the service itself: its deﬁnition including its imple-
mentation as a piece of software and description via
models of its behaviour, conﬁguration (by specifying
management models) for use at a service provider,
anddeploymenttomakeitexecutableusingallocated
resources;
 resources: their acquisition by the service provider,
and their allocation (or deallocation) for use by a par-
ticular service according to the provider’s manage-
ment policies;
 the SLA offer (or template): the speciﬁcation by the
service provider of terms (including dependability
commitments) under which they can make the ser-
vice accessible, and the publication of these terms to
potential consumers;
 the interaction between a service provider and a ser-
vice consumer: this includes the initial request for an
SLA based on a published template/offer, the grant-
ing (or otherwise) of the request leading to an SLA
being made between the two, and enabling access to
the service under this SLA.
The solid lines in Figure 2 represent state transitions
in each of these processes. The loose coupling between
the processes is indicated by the dashed arrows linking
different processes, which signify that one process must
be in a given state for the other process to enter a given
state. For example, consumer interactions have a state
where the service is accessible to the consumer. This state
can only be reached if the service is deployed at the ser-
vice provider, which is denoted by the dashed arrow from
the ‘Service Deployed’ state in the service lifecycle to the
‘ServiceAccessible’stateintheconsumerinteractionlife-
cycle. To summarise these couplings:
 the service must be deﬁned before an SLA Tem-
plate (speciﬁcation of offered dependability commit-
ments) can be formulated;
 theSLA Templatemust bepublished beforepotential
consumers can request an SLA embodying its com-
mitments;
 the service must be conﬁgured with a management
policy before resources can be allocated to it;
 at least some resources must be allocated before a
service can be deployed; and
 a service must be deployed before it can be made ac-
cessible to consumers.Resilient Critical Infrastructure Management using Service Oriented Architecture — A Test Case using A-CDM 5
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Fig. 2. Lifecycle Models
The main purpose of the SERSCIS Framework is
to support the use of SLA in consumer interactions with
a service, including the introduction of Service Offers
and SLA creation, and to facilitate coupling between
consumer interactions, service management and resource
management, keeping them all consistent with the de-
pendability commitments made in the SLA (Hovestadt,
2006; Hasselmeyer et al., 2006).
The loose couplings represented by dashed arrows in
Figure 2 allow for many possible scenarios. For example,
at one extreme the provider may procure and allocate re-
sources and deploy the service long before they start to de-
ﬁne SLA templates to specify their dependability commit-
ments. This may be a common scenario where a service
is already operating and the provider decides to introduce
SERSCIS technology to manage its dependability.
At the other extreme, the provider may acquire the
service implementation (i.e. the software), then create and
publish SLA templates, and wait until they have agreed an
SLA with a consumer before even conﬁguring the service.
This scenario must be followed where service providers
are willing to negotiate over the exact service levels and
other speciﬁcations with consumers. In such cases, the
SLA template includes service metrics but not agreed lev-
els, and the policies to regulate services have to be conﬁg-
ured after the SLA is negotiated. In practice, it is difﬁcult
and/or costly for a service provider to manage resources
andservicesagainstalargenumberofpotentiallydifferent
commitments (McKee et al., 2007). In SERSCIS we cur-
rently consider only the case where the management pol-
icy is deﬁned ﬁrst, and a limited (discrete) set of SLA tem-
plates are derived from it, which encode non-negotiable
dependability commitments that the management policy
is able to meet.
Finally, although Figure 2 does not explicitly show
cardinality, in practice the couplings can be many-to-
many. For example, one SLA may cover several services
and one service may be accessible to different consumers
under many different SLA. Similarly, services may need
multiple resources, and multiple services may share re-
sources, and so on. Keeping track of these relationships
is one of the key requirements for a dynamic, (semi-
)autonomous management architecture.
7. Service Provider Architecture
Given the above model for the lifecycle, it is possible to
deﬁne a high-level service provider architecture for SER-
SCIS Framework components to manage services (and
consumer interactions), SLA and resources during each
phase of their respective lifecycles, as shown in Figure 3.
The software components include the service inter-
faceandworkﬂoworchestrator, alongwithSERSCISgov-
ernance components to support the management of ser-
vices, resources and SLA. These components are:
 a security Service Access Control Point, able to re-
strict access to the service according to a security
policy that must be dynamically updatable (Boniface
et al., 2005);
 an SLA Manager that hosts SLA templates and han-
dles requests from clients for SLA based on them:
the SLA manager grants new SLAs, provides infor-
mation to the clients on their status, and may termi-
nate existing SLAs if required;6 M. Hall-May, M. Surridge and R. Nossal-T¨ uyeni
Fig. 3. High-level Service-Provider Architecture
 a Service Manager that monitors the Quality of Ser-
vice (QoS) and Quality of Experience (QoE) reports
and analyses them using the service model against
theprovider’sservicecommitmentsandmanagement
policy, andinitiatesappropriatemanagementactions;
 a Resource Manager that handles the acquisi-
tion/allocation and removal of resources, and main-
tains a registry (Radetzki et al., 2007) of these re-
sources in which the orchestrator can discover re-
sources when it has to execute a service workﬂow.
Governancecomponentsaredeployedateachservice
provider that wishes to manage some or all of their ser-
vices. In this way, governance remains distributed and
light weight, without the need for a monolithic gover-
nance ‘agent’. Components within each service provider
communicate via an Enterprise Service Bus (ESB), which
allows them to be loosely coupled. The relationship be-
tween these information sources and the lifecycle models
from Figure 2 are as follows:
 the system model and management policy are cre-
ated by software developers and system administra-
tors using SERSCIS ontologies, supported by SER-
SCIS modelling and decision support tools;
 service commitments are created or removed when
an SLA is negotiated or terminated, based on an SLA
Template;
 the service access policy is dynamically generated
when the service is deployed, and updated when an
SLA is negotiated or terminated;
 the QoS event stream is generated by a service inter-
face (or wrapper to a black-box service (Michlmayr
et al., 2008)) based on what is provided by or can be
measured by the service;
 the QoE event stream is generated by the orchestrator
when using other services based on what is measur-
able by or meaningful to the consumer of that ser-
vice. Note that while QoS is a measure of what the
service provides to its consumers, QoE is a measure
of how its resources (including other services) have
performed; and
 resourceregistryentriesarecreatedorremovedwhen
resources are procured and allocated or de-allocated.
Actions taken by the Service Manager may induce
changes in the available resources, according to the man-
agement policy of the provider. For example, it may ask
the Resource Manager to negotiate additional SLAs to
provide greater resource volume or redundancy, or allo-
cate more in-house resources. Alternatively it may seek
to manage demand on the service. For example, it may
simply revoke the SLA template so that no new SLAs can
be granted by the SLA Manager, preventing any further
increase in the level of service commitments. It may go
further, by updating the security access policy to restrict
access if the SLA allows this. It may even ask the SLA
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itself may also support some management actions to in-
ﬂuence its behaviour, and the Service Manager can use
these if the management policy allows it. These actions
can in principle be taken automatically, implementing the
‘automated’ management loop from Figure 1.
SERSCIS components also provide administration
interfaces giving operators direct access to the Service
Manager, SLA Manager and Resource Manager, and to
the associated models, policies and monitoring data. In
many situations, the management policy will instruct the
Service Manager to inform an operator that action is
needed, leaving a human to decide whether and if so how
to act. The operator can then implement their action di-
rectlyonthecriticalinfrastructure, byaccessingSERSCIS
components or by changing the models and policies used
to control them. This provides the ‘assisted’ management
loop in Figure 1.
Finally, SERSCIS provides decision support facili-
ties to help operators understand the behaviour of the sys-
tem, based on events generated by the components shown
in Figure 3. As noted above, this facility will also be use-
ful prior to operation of the SERSCIS-enabled ICT infras-
tructure, allowing an analysis of risks using the service
model during the design phase, and providing insights
into the commitments that can be made and the manage-
ment policies needed to meet them. These tools will also
play a role in auditing processes used to analyse and ver-
ify/improve the management of the infrastructure.
A number of application services are managed by a
single governance component, comprising a service man-
ager, SLA manager and resource manager. The orches-
tration component coordinates workﬂows involving ‘lo-
cal’ resources as well as resources encapsulated in ser-
vices from other organisations. A SERSCIS-assisted op-
erator has an overview of all the services within a given
organisational/operational domain. The operator’s situa-
tional awareness is supplemented by a decision support
component, which uses a model of the whole system. The
‘whole system’ may include details of concepts outside of
the operator’s immediate control, i.e. involving the reper-
cussions that local actions will have on the wider system
of systems. These system models may be shared across
organisational boundaries.
8. Layered Approach
Figure 4 shows three concentric dependability manage-
ment loops that arise from the SERSCIS architecture.
Similar to Kramer and Magee’s model for autonomic sys-
tems (Kramer and Magee, 2009), this allows runtime in-
formation to propagate up to system decision makers and
governance actions to ﬂow down to control service execu-
tion. System modelling and decision support components
are closely linked and may run synchronously; however,
with respect to governance and workﬂow components, the
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Fig. 4. Concentric Dependability Management Feedback Loops
execution is entirely asynchronous.
The inner runtime loop runs at the speed of the appli-
cation services, selecting the most appropriate resources
and executing the workﬂow. The governance loop moni-
tors and manages resources against SLA commitments, at
a slower rate. This loop has to be asynchronous with re-
specttoapplicationresponsesbecauseitisofteninfeasible
for the orchestrator to wait while a new SLA is negoti-
ated and approved. Finally, the outer loop runs even more
slowly so SERSCIS-assisted human operators can be in-
volved, making changes to autonomic governance poli-
cies in response to changes in key performance indicators
(KPI).
It is this separation of decisions, which simpliﬁes the
workthateachsetofcomponentsmustdo, thatistheguid-
ing principle of SERSCIS. Such a layered approach to the
architecture was taken in recognition of real-world busi-
ness practices and performance.
9. A-CDM Test Case
Airport Collaborative Decision Making (A-CDM) brings
together the main airport partners — Air Trafﬁc Control
(ATC), Airport Operators, Airlines, Ground Handlers, and
Europe’s Centrol Flow Management Unit (CFMU) — to
share operational data. Such information sharing is fun-
damental to achieving a common situational awareness,
which improves decision making (Aguado, 2009). The
SERSCIS test case focuses on the process of ‘turning
round’ an aircraft from the moment it arrives ‘in block’
to when it taxis out for take-off.
Airport Collaborative Decision Making is an ap-
proach to optimizing resource usage and improving time-
liness at an airport. It is about all partners at an air-
port working together, openly sharing accurate informa-
tion and — based on the information — making decisions
together. Through the use of A-CDM predictability of air-
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ing around an aircraft can be planned more accurately and
the plans can more easily be controlled with respect to the
actual operation. This yield a number of beneﬁts:
 Usage of resources can be optimized. If every actor
knows more accurately where and when human and
physical resources are needed, resource scheduling is
more easily able to meet these demands and to avoid
bottlenecks while at the same time preventing exten-
sive periods of idling resources.
 While it is not a goal to increase airport capacity by
A-CDM, the concept allows better use of the avail-
able capacity. Through accurate planning, the waste
of departure and arrival slots, a scarce and therefore
precious resource at most major airports, is reduced.
 Accurate planning and continuous monitoring devi-
ations enables countermeasures to be set proactively
in case problems arise. Thus the timeliness of opera-
tions and — most importantly — timeliness of ﬂights
increase. This is beneﬁcial for airlines and their cus-
tomers alike.
All of these beneﬁts are relevant at the local and re-
gional level. Yet, A-CDM also has a European, network-
wide perspective. The Central Flow Management Unit of
Eurocontrol monitors the capacity of airspace sectors and
imposes restrictions by issuing so-called ‘slots’ in case
congestion might arise. Currently, this planning is mainly
based on ﬂight plan information that is ﬁled up to three
hours before the actual ﬂight. Changes, in particular last
minute changes e.g. due to late passengers, are not taken
into account. Hence, everyday a huge amount of airspace
capacity is wasted due to inaccurate information. The Air-
ports applying A-CDM can more accurately determine the
take-off time of departing ﬂights
9.1. Why is this Scenario ‘Critical’?. The focus of
the scenario is on airside ground-handling activities dur-
ing aircraft turnaround, exploiting collaborative decision-
making between the organisations and actors involved
within an airport. This process is critical to the smooth
and safe operation of European air transport because:
 it determines the readiness of aircraft for take-off,
which has to be predicted reliably as an input to Eu-
ropean air trafﬁc management;
 ithastobeadaptedtocopewithchangeselsewherein
the air trafﬁc infrastructure, e.g. delays to incoming
ﬂights, or disruption of ground handling resources
such as supplies or staff;
 it provides opportunities for malicious attack, such
as Denial of Service (DoS), to damage European air
transport.
Malicious attacks may be directed against ground
handling resources, aiming to disrupt aircraft turnaround
or to gain unauthorised access to aircraft. They may also
be directed against the ICT systems used for collaborative
decision making, to disrupt ground handling operations or
the ﬂow of information between these operations and Eu-
ropean air trafﬁc management.
9.2. Aircraft Turnaround. The turn-around of a sin-
gle aircraft involves multiple actors with different roles:
 the airline, who operates the aircraft, schedules the
inbound and outbound ﬂights and ultimately pays for
the turn-around services used;
 the European and local (airport) air trafﬁc manage-
ment services, who allocate and manage the use of
airspace including airport landing and takeoff slots,
provide information about inbound ﬂights, and need
predictions when aircraft will be ready for outbound
ﬂights;
 an A-CDM information service provider, which op-
erates an A-CDM Information Sharing Platform
(ACISP)forexchanginginformationbetweentheair-
line, air trafﬁc and ground handling service providers
at the airport;
 the ground handling organisation, who coordinates
the provision of services to the aircraft to make it
ready for take-off;
 the provider(s) of ground handling services: in our
scenario these include aircraft cleaning, refuelling,
baggage unloading and loading, and catering.
In the test case scenario, we consider that some (but
not all) of the above actors provide their services in com-
petition with each other. Some redundancy is therefore
available in the airport and the premise of SERSCIS is that
by using agile SOA, one can adapt the information sharing
networks sufﬁciently rapidly to exploit this redundancy to
improve overall dependability.
The idea here is that without SERSCIS, the airline
has to choose a ground handler and order turnaround ser-
vice for each scheduled aircraft movement through the
airport. The airline and air trafﬁc service providers be-
tween them determine if and when the aircraft will land,
and share this information with the ground handler via
the ACISP. This enables the ground handler to manage
its resources (including services from the four types of ac-
tors on the right of Figure 5), to plan and execute the turn
around. Note that the airline must have a relationship with
its ground handler, but it might not trigger ground han-
dling actions directly except through the ACISP, so this
relationship is therefore shown as a dashed line in Figure
5. Airlines may also have their own fuelling, baggage,Resilient Critical Infrastructure Management using Service Oriented Architecture — A Test Case using A-CDM 9
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Fig. 5. Actors and Services in the A-CDM Test Case
cleaning and catering services at some airports, but these
relationships do not exist at all airports and for reasons of
simplicity are not shown at all.
We assume here that there is only one A-CDM
provider that allows information to be shared between the
local and European ATM providers and multiple airlines
and ground handling providers. The ground handler or-
chestrates the provision of the four air-side turn-around
services each of which can also have multiple providers,
as shown.
9.3. Milestone Approach. In order to structure the
turn-around process at an airport, Eurocontrol has devised
the so-called milestone approach. Each milestone de-
ﬁnes a signiﬁcant event along a timeline that shows the
progress of a ﬂight. The milestones cover the entire rota-
tion, i.e. the inbound as well as the turn-around and the
beginning of the outbound phase. Figure 6, taken from
(Aguado, 2009), shows the milestones.
For more details on the milestones, please refer to the
Airport CDM Implementation Manual (Aguado, 2009).
Two milestones are of speciﬁc importance to the turn-
around of an aircraft. Firstly, the estimated landing time
(ELDT) and its actual value ALDT determine the begin-
ning of the turn-around phase of a rotation. Adding the
taxi time estimate to the ELDT results in the estimated in-
blocktime(EIBT).Thistimeestimateisthemainschedul-
ing event for the ground handlers and their resources. As
soon as an aircraft is in-block, ground handling must com-
mence. Thus the ground handler has to ensure availability
of personnel and equipment at the aircraft stand.
The second major milestone is the target off-block
time (TOBT). This is newly introduced with A-CDM.
This estimate or target is provided by the ground handler
and states when he expects the aircraft to be ready for go-
ing off-block. It marks the limit between the turn-around
and the outbound phase of a ﬂight. Thus it forms the ba-
sis for all further calculations. From the TOBT the target
take-off time (TTOT) is calculated and sent to CFMU of
Eurocontrol in Brussels. As mentioned above, CFMU op-
timises the network performance for the whole of Europe
— a task that is substantially easier and provides better
results given the more accurate TOBT rather than the cur-
rently used estimated off-block time (EOBT) taken from
ATC ﬂight plans.
9.4. SERSCIS Test Bed. The focus of the test bed is
on information ﬂows complementing the turn-around for
a speciﬁc subset of the full process. The test bed considers
the information exchange between CFMU, ATC, ACISP,
a ground handler and ramp service providers such as a
fuelling company. ICT systems of the above mentioned
actors are interconnected and exchange information vital
to A-CDM.
At the same time the interconnection between the
ground handler and the ramp service providers has an un-
derlying physical workﬂow that takes place at the airport
apron. This workﬂow is represented by the information
ﬂow. The ground handler needs to inform the ramp ser-
vice providers of the incoming aircraft well in advance so
they can schedule their resources. When the aircraft is in
the vicinity of the airport, the information by the ground
handler is used to actually dispatch the resources of the
respective ramp service provider. Upon completion of his
job a ramp service provider informs the ground handler,
who can then trigger the next step in the turn-around pro-
cess.
Figure 7 illustrates the turn-around of long-haul air-
craft. The example is adapted from the turn-around plan-
ning of a real airline. It shows two different workﬂow
streams, one concerned with passengers and the cabin, the
second with catering, fuelling and baggage handling.10 M. Hall-May, M. Surridge and R. Nossal-T¨ uyeni
Fig. 6. The Milestone Approach
Fig. 7. Turn-Around Timeline Example
As stated above, the information ﬂow shown here
represents a subset of the full turn-around ﬂow. While
it gives the full picture of the interactions and information
exchanges, ithasbeenstrippedofsomedetailsforthesake
of readability and understandability of the test bed. while
still showing the interdependencies of critical ICT infras-
tructure. The test bed represents the ICT systems of ma-
jor players like Eurocontrol’s CFMU, an ATC provider, a
ground handler and a CDM system (ACISP) and their in-
teractions. Of the mentioned systems ATC and CFMU are
to be considered critical from a safety as well as a busi-
ness point of view. Disruption of the CFMU systems, e.g.
by erroneous inputs from data providing systems, would
reduce capacity in the European air trafﬁc network with
catastrophic effects on the aviation industry.
The test bed has a clear ICT focus while at the same
time being coupled to physical processes and workﬂows
at an airport. Many of the interactions taking place in the
physical world are accompanied by message exchanges in
the ICT system, for example by time stamps being cre-
ated in the ACISP. Scheduling and execution of essential
services at an airport during aircraft turn-around are based
on timing information stemming from players like CFMU
or ATC and being communicated via ICT systems. Hence
there is a tight link and a strong similarity between the in-
formation and work ﬂow in the ICT systems and the phys-
ical processes conducted.
The test case scenario and test bed have been de-
veloped in collaboration with Austro Control, the Aus-
trian Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP). CDM is
a cornerstone of the business interests of Austro Control,
which is actively involved in the implementation of Air-
port CDM at Vienna airport. As such, Austro control can
contribute realistic expertise to the test bed to ensure a
close alignment of the scenario with the real world.
The test bed is a realistic example of a CDM system.
This and the foundation of the Eurocontrol CDM imple-
mentation manual make the results relevant for other air-
ports in Europe. Note that the interactions between the
Ground Handler and ramp services are not speciﬁed by
Eurocontrol, but the ﬂow of information from the airport
to the ATC stakeholders (which depends on the GroundResilient Critical Infrastructure Management using Service Oriented Architecture — A Test Case using A-CDM 11
Handler) is.
9.5. Test Bed Information Flow. The previous sec-
tion set the stage for the implementation of the test bed of
SERSCIS. Embedding the actual test bed into the above
described Airport CDM scenario proves its real-world rel-
evance. For the purpose of the test bed an information
ﬂow between the CFMU, ATC, a ground handler, a fu-
elling company and the aircraft crew is chosen. Figure 8
shows this information ﬂow.
The main ideas of the information ﬂow are on the
one hand a continuous update of the ELDT, so that the
fuelling service can prepare for its operation. On the other
hand, basedoncompletiontimeestimatesfromthefueller,
the ground handler issues TOBTs. These form the basis
for calculating a TTOT and consequently being assigned
a ‘slot’, or calculated take-off time (CTOT), by CFMU.
The upper half of the sequence diagram in Figure 8
deals with the inbound part of the turn-around. From the
moment the aircraft takes off from the outstation continu-
ous updates of the ELDT and, based on this, the EIBT are
derived from either CFMU or local ATC systems. Apart
from storing these values in the ACISP they are used by
the ground handler and the ramp services (the fueller in
this example), to schedule and prepare the turn-around.
WhentheaircraftentersﬁnalapproachandlandstheEIBT
estimates are improved until the aircraft ﬁnally goes in-
block.
Then the actual turn-around starts, which is shown in
the lower half of the diagram. During this, two main in-
terrelated ﬂows take place. On the one hand the ground
handler communicates with the fueller to determine the
estimated end of the turn-around (TOBT) and updates this
value in the ACISP. This is based on estimates by the fu-
eller (and other ramp services) of when they will ﬁnish.
On the other hand, there is the interaction between
CFMU, ATC and ACISP. As explained in the above se-
quence the ground handler updates the TOBT of the
aircraft whenever a signiﬁcant event in the turn-around
changes the expected ready time of the aircraft. Using
the TOBT ACISP calculates the earliest possible take-off
time of the aircraft, called TTOT.
Upon conﬁrmation of the TOBT (30 minutes before
EOBT in the Vienna implementation) ACISP sends the in-
formation to the CFMU and in turn receives a slot (CTOT)
for the ﬂight. ATC uses this information for sequence
planning and issues a target start-up approval (TSAT) for
the aircraft. Apart from the slot information the sequenc-
ing takes into account a number of parameters including:
 Airline preferences
 Queue lengths at the holding points
 Taxiway blocking
Target Off‐
block Time
Target 
Take‐off 
Time
Calculated 
Take‐off 
Time
Target 
Start‐up 
Approval 
Time
(Variable) Taxi Time
(Variable) Taxi Time, 
Airline preferences
CFMU
Departure Planning 
Information message
Fig. 9. Communication CFMU-ATC and TSAT Calculation
 Adverse conditions such as construction on taxiways
When the aircraft is ready the pilot informs ATC. At
the pre-assigned TSAT for the aircraft ATC issues a start-
up approval. This information ﬂow is depicted in Figure
9.
The information ﬂow thus incorporates the local air-
port dimension in the interaction between ATC, ACISP
as information broker, the ground handler and the fueller
and other ramp services. The European dimension is rep-
resented in this test bed as well by the interaction between
CFMU, ATC and ACISP. Yet, these two dimensions are
not isolated but closely interact. Similarly, the ICT sys-
tems of all actors in both dimensions are interconnected
and exchange information.
Through this interconnection there is the risk of fail-
ure propagation (‘cascading faults’). A disruption in one
service at the airport will trigger changes at the local level
(TOBT) that potentially induce changes on a European
level (CTOT). Worse than the actual disruption of a ser-
vice could be the effects of an attack on ICT systems of
local services with the purpose of providing false values
for ﬁnishing times. A coordinated attack to several ser-
vices, probably on several airports, would cause ripples of
disruption in the entire European air trafﬁc network.
Finally, it is important to note here that the sequence
diagram depicted in Figure 8 shows the physical ﬂow
of information, which includes the ACISP as intermedi-
ate and information broker. The corresponding logical
ﬂow takes place between real actors like ATC and ground
handlers without an intermediate ACISP. This distinc-
tion between logical (end-to-end) and actual (transmission
path) communications may be signiﬁcant when consider-
ing possible reconﬁguration to maintain resilience in the
event of failures.
10. How SERSCIS Helps
The approach used in SERSCIS is to exploit ICT sys-
tems modelling and the adaptive nature of service ori-
ented architectures to contain problems by adapting the
ICT network. This may be done by human operators using
insights supported by SERSCIS technology, or in some12 M. Hall-May, M. Surridge and R. Nossal-T¨ uyeni
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cases through autonomic management of the ICT services
through which information is exchanged.
We further assume that because each actor has their
own business agenda, none of them is in overall control
of the information exchange network. Each actor man-
ages their information ﬂows (and associated physical pro-
cesses) according to their own needs, but subject to agree-
ments with other actors on how their information systems
and physical processes will interact. These SLAs play a
key role in the SERSCIS approach, because they provide
themeanstomanageinterdependenciesandrelateindivid-
ual actor performance to the performance of the air trafﬁc
management network as a whole.
We must also bear in mind that no ICT management
methodology can ever prevent disruption to airport opera-
tions and/or air trafﬁc movements. Our goal is therefore to
minimise the effects of such disruption, and ensure their
consequences remain manageable. We have a special fo-
cus on preventing problems (including malicious attacks)
atalocallevelfromcausingwiderdisruptionthroughnon-
local (inter-actor) information interdependencies.
There are three basic mechanisms available by which
SERSCIS can help to manage problems and make the sys-
tem and its components more dependable:
 by identifying potential problems through system
modelling, and redesigning the system (and the as-
sociated model) to eliminate the problem or prevent
it having any impact;
 by detecting a one-off problem during an aircraft
turnaround, and managing its impact through auto-
nomic workﬂow recomposition or service manage-
ment action;
 by detecting a recurrent or systematic problem and
managing its impact on future aircraft turnarounds
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The ﬁrst option is really only available to system
designers and developers at system design (or redesign)
time. The value of SERSCIS innovations here arises
through the contribution to system modelling capabilities,
e.g. the use of semantic domain or dependability models
developed to model dynamic interdependent systems.
The second option can be used to mitigate problems
when they arise during operation. For this to be effective,
the corrective action must have an immediate effect and
improve the dependability of information ﬂows about the
aircraftaffectedbytheproblem. Thiswillalmostcertainly
depend on the problem or at least its impact on informa-
tion ﬂows having been foreseen. If the problem arises in
the ICT domain and can be detected at an early stage, it
maybepossibletomitigateitsimpactbyapplyingICTdo-
main mitigation strategies — e.g. by using an alternative
provider of data if the data are unexpectedly unavailable
when needed. However, if the problem arises in the phys-
ical domain and has only a secondary impact on the in-
formation ﬂows, it is unlikely that SERSCIS will be able
to mitigate the effects. For example, suppose there is a
passenger no-show, but the baggage handling crew unex-
pectedly fails to return promptly to ofﬂoad their bag. The
aircraft will be delayed, and may miss its allocated take
off slot. Since the problem was not foreseen, at least some
of the information exchanged about this aircraft will have
been invalid. But SERSCIS cannot detect this until it is
too late to mitigate the effect (a missed slot) for this air-
craft.
SERSCIS can be of value in detecting when a prob-
lem is not in fact ‘one off’ — i.e. when it is a recurrent
(butpreviouslyunforeseen)failurescenario, orasymptom
of some deeper systemic problem. This is where the third
type of mitigation strategy can help: systemic adaptation.
For example, suppose the baggage handlers are regularly
unable to respond promptly to deal with an unattended
bag. SERSCIS could then alert the affected actor (the
ground handler), allowing system changes to deal with the
consequences. One solution might be to add a policy re-
quiring baggage handlers to guarantee how long they will
take to unload an unattended bag. Another option could
be to reconﬁgure the workﬂow so that the ground han-
dler does not provide a TOBT update (which results in
CFMU’s issuing a take-off slot) until there are no unat-
tended bags present on the aircraft. A third option might
be to provide an update to TOBT early in the workﬂow,
but specifying a later time to allow for a possible unat-
tended baggage handling delay.
Such systemic mitigation strategies will not miti-
gate the impact of a problem on an individual aircraft
turnaround, but should improve dependability over more
extended periods of operation, e.g. one or more days. It is
also important to recognise that systemic mitigation will
usually involve human intervention by an operator repre-
senting the affected actor. Finally, note that autonomic ‘in
the loop’ and systemic adaptations must be applied locally
by an affected actor, in this case the ground handler. These
actions will typically involve a trade off between the ac-
tor’s own business goals (e.g. to minimise aircraft turn-
around time) and global dependability objectives (e.g. to
minimise the number of missed slots).
10.1. Turnaround Scenario. Figure 10 shows the ser-
vices involved in the test case and how SERSCIS com-
ponents are deployed. Each organisational/operational
boundaries and thus represent a service provider. SER-
SCIS system models, decision support, governance and
orchestration components are installed at ground handler.
The SERSCIS framework can only directly access ser-
vices and resources local to the ground handler. Access
to external resources is via service requests. Other service
providers (Airline, Fuel and Catering companies) may or
may not have SERSCIS. Figure 10 does not show all the
SERSCIS features at all these providers where they may
be used.
The fuel service in the test case is assumed to be
one of many available in the service registry. The exact
one that is used is chosen at runtime based on availabil-
ity, price or any other QoS criteria speciﬁed in the SLA.
The relationship with the catering company is managed
by a long-term contract and hence is likely to be the only
resource in the service registry from which the workﬂow
composer can choose.
If the other service providers in Figure 10 (Airline,
Fuel company, Catering company) are also SERSCIS en-
abled, their services will have their own governance and
orchestration components, which provide automated man-
agement, and their own SERSCIS-assisted operator, who
provides human and assisted management (the latter sup-
ported by SERSCIS decision support tools). Without
SERSCIS components, SLA and resource management
(includingmaintainingarepositoryofavailableresources)
and workﬂow orchestration are a manual process, which
may not even be consistent between organisations. With
SERSCIS, not only are these processes computer-assisted,
but they can be made mutually consistent between service
providers by sharing aspects of the overall system model
and ontology.
10.2. Service Disruption Scenarios. The function-
ing of the services involved in the orchestration of the
turnaround are typically subject to many kinds of threats
that could cause disruption to the turnaround. In order to
cover the SERSCIS mechanisms as comprehensively as
possible, we distinguish three basic types of threats ac-
cording to their recurrence and the countermeasure that
SERSCIS supports:
(M1) One-off threats or failures, for which SERSCIS can
help to mitigate the effects.14 M. Hall-May, M. Surridge and R. Nossal-T¨ uyeni
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Fig. 10. SERSCIS Components and Services in the A-CDM Test Case
(M2) Recurring failures, for which SERSCIS can support
the mitigation by systematic adaptation.
(M3) System problems identiﬁed in modelling and pre-
vented from happening by redesigning the system.
From a phenomenal cause point of view, failures can
be induced by physical (C1) or by ICT related compro-
mises (C2). However, in both cases the primary concern
is the impact on, and the usage of, the ICT facilities to
mitigate the threats.
Three failure scenarios are devised to cover the eval-
uation goals listed above.
10.2.1. Compromise of Ramp Service Availability.
This scenario covers recurrence and countermeasures M1
and M2 and cause C1. Resources needed by the ramp
service may be compromised by an unexpected external
(physical world) event. For example, cleaning crews may
go on strike, fuel delivery trucks may break down, fuel
supplies may be interrupted. This may lead ramp services
to be delivered late or not at all.
Such failures will have an impact on the quality of in-
formation provided by the Ground Handler to the ACISP
and thence to the CFMU. The Ground Handler calculates
the estimate of when an aircraft will be ready to leave
based on the availability of ramp services as communi-
cated ahead of time by their service providers. If ramp
services are then late or fail to appear (forcing the Ground
Handler to reschedule the turnaround), the previous es-
timate of when the aircraft can leave will be wrong. In
many cases this will force the aircraft to miss its take-off
slot allocated by CFMU. If too many aircraft miss their
slots, this will adversely impact the capacity of European
airspace (not just at the affected airport).
SERSCIS allows problems of this type to be detected
by the Ground Handler as soon as a ramp service fails
to appear. If the scheduling of ramp services is handled
by coupling ICT systems via a service-oriented architec-
ture, it should be easy to switch to an alternative service
provider. SERSCIS can support this through the use of
adaptive service orchestration technology, but this will
not make the original estimate of aircraft take-off time
more accurate. However, SERSCIS can provide a means
to classify ramp service failure events according to their
likelihood of recurrence, based on a model of their ex-
tended interdependencies. This allows the Ground Han-
dler to adapt their processes for ramp service selection or
for calculating the expected aircraft ready time for future
aircraft allowing for the identiﬁed disruption.
10.2.2. Physical Distributed DoS Attack. A passen-
ger who has checked in luggage does not show up for
boarding. Consequently his luggage needs to be unloaded.
In its simple form this is a scenario handled by counter-
measure M1 (alternative workﬂow applied). It is caused
by type C1. A physical DoS attack compromises the avail-
ability of physical resources, which leads to the ICT re-
quirement to detect and resist such an attack.
Realising the potential disruption that a passenger
with a checked bag that ‘no shows’ can cause, an attacker
organises a group of individuals to try to disrupt ﬂight op-
erations through a coordinated attack. A large number of
people are convinced to knowingly check in bags and fail
to show up at the gate when called.
All attackers in this scenario are passengers regis-
tered for different ﬂights. A distributed attack across mul-
tiple ﬂights is potentially disruptive on a wide scale, given
that detection of an unattended bag must be made repeat-
edly at different gates and at different times. The delay
to each ﬂight owing to ofﬂoading the unattended bag is
likely to create a disturbance that is only notable from a
‘system- level’ perspective (i.e. from the perspective of an
airline across all of its ﬂights, the airport or the ATC).
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nodifferenttogenuineno-showsandcanbehandledfairly
easily. However, in combination they represent a signiﬁ-
cant threat to the ability of the airport to continue func-
tioning, as many ﬂights place greater demand on a shared
resource (the baggage handlers), which may not be able
to cope with the increased and unexpected load. Fur-
thermore, CFMU will have to revise many of the take-off
slots, resulting in potential delays at destination airports.
SERSCIS should be able to detect the number of
TOBT updates resulting from this attack, representing the
anomalous rate of unattended bags, and alert the actors
allowing them to change their procedures. For example,
the GH might delay conformation of TOBT until the pas-
senger check is complete — this will delay take-off, but
prevents the problem cascading into the ATM network.
10.2.3. Degraded ACISP Dependability. The ACISP
is critical to the A-CDM solution. Therefore, its perfor-
mance and dependability is critical in terms of maintain-
ing the integrity of the information provided to it, making
that information available to others in a timely fashion,
and notifying CFMU, ATC and AO/GH of inconsisten-
cies in the information. There are therefore many ways in
which the ACISP could fail, some of which are obvious,
while others may not be immediately apparent to users of
the system. If the ACISP exhibits degraded performance
and passes on data after some delay, this could for exam-
ple be caused by an ICT DoS attack that overloads the
ACISP. Hence this is a failure caused by type C2. In its
ﬁrst occurrence this will be treated as a one-off event with
countermeasures of type M1. A deeper evaluation could
reveal malicious causes for this behaviour and trigger ac-
tions of type M2 on a longer scale.
In this scenario, we can consider the situation in
which the failure mode of the ACISP involves ﬂight infor-
mation to be updated late. That is, information providers
such as CFMU, ATC and the Ground Handler put up-
dated estimates of times relating to ﬂight milestones (e.g.
ELDT, TOBT). ACISP calculates times derived from
these estimates, such as EIBT and TTOT. Consider for ex-
ample, that the underperformance of the ACISP causes a
long delay between the provision of TOBT by GH and the
availability of this updated value and the derived value for
TTOT to other users. ATC and CFMU will see the update
eventually (as the service has not failed entirely), but the
delay will restrict the amount of time they have to react to
any problems (e.g. if the ﬂight cannot make its assigned
slot). Furthermore, the GH may be blamed for the late
update of TOBT if the failure does not affect information
stored for all ﬂights.
The role of SERSCIS in this scenario is to detect
the degraded ACISP performance by monitoring against
dependability agreements. SERSCIS then addresses the
deﬁcit by allocating more ICT resources, or alerts the (hu-
man) operator if this is not possible. SERSCIS should
also allow other operators to mitigate the effect of the de-
graded performance, e.g. by using alternative communi-
cation paths for time-critical information exchanges. It
should also be possible for ACISP or CFMU to compen-
sate for the slow communication, e.g. by adapting internal
workﬂows to allow more time between the reported TTOT
andtheissued CTOT,so anyexceptionshavetimeto prop-
agate back to CFMU.
11. Conclusion
A high-level service architecture has been introduced for
a SERSCIS Framework to support and manage critical
infrastructure ICT services. This allows risks in oper-
ating critical infrastructure to be managed by augment-
ing current ‘slow’ human-initiated management with au-
tomated and assisted management of ICT components and
services. The service architecture maps to the lifecycle
of an SLA: the deﬁnition of a service, the description of
SLA templates, the negotiation of SLA, and the selection
and invocation of services as part of a workﬂow (includ-
ing renegotiation/revocation of SLA). To create and ex-
ecute such a workﬂow comprising distributed services,
while maintaining an overall level of dependability, re-
quires models of information regarding performance char-
acteristics, threats and countermeasures. The SERSCIS
architecture takes a layered approach to help solve the
conceptual integration, while the use of common compo-
nents (a resource registry and ESB) addresses the prag-
matics of integration and allows for loose coupling be-
tween the components.
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